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Abstract We present new Multiagent learning (MAL) algorithms with the general
philosophy of policy convergence against some classes of opponents but otherwise ensuring
high payoffs. We consider a 3-class breakdown of opponent types: (eventually) stationary,
self-play and “other” (see Definition 4) agents. We start with ReDVaLeR that can satisfy
policy convergence against the first two types and no-regret against the third, but it needs to
know the type of the opponents. This serves as a baseline to delineate the difficulty of achieving these goals. We show that a simple modification on ReDVaLeR yields a new algorithm,
RVσ (t) , that achieves no-regret payoffs in all games, and convergence to Nash equilibria
in self-play (and to best response against eventually stationary opponents — a corollary of
no-regret) simultaneously, without knowing the opponent types, but in a smaller class of
games than ReDVaLeR . RVσ (t) effectively ensures the performance of a learner during the
process of learning, as opposed to the performance of a learned behavior. We show that the
expression for regret of RVσ (t) can have a slightly better form than those of other comparable
algorithms like GIGA and GIGA-WoLF though, contrastingly, our analysis is in continuous
time. Moreover, experiments show that RVσ (t) can converge to an equilibrium in some cases
where GIGA, GIGA-WoLF would fail, and to better equilibria where GIGA, GIGA-WoLF
converge to undesirable equilibria (coordination games). This important class of coordination
games also highlights the key desirability of policy convergence as a criterion for MAL in
self-play instead of high average payoffs. To our knowledge, this is also the first successful
(guaranteed) attempt at policy convergence of a no-regret algorithm in the Shapley game.
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1 Introduction
Agent technologies are being increasingly deployed in several business and industry domains,
including B2B exchanges, supply chain management, car manufacturing etc, and are already
providing sustained and dramatic benefits. Demands from e-Commerce, particularly on-line
auctions, and distributed computing communities are also producing revolutionary ideas in
the Agents and Multiagent systems (MAS) research domains. However, user confidence in a
fully automated agent driven application is noticeably lacking; a “human in the loop” mind
set seems hard to overcome. The main reasons for such lack of trust in complete automation
are scalability and non-existence of reasonable guarantees in performance of self-adapting
software.
Existing on-line learning algorithms in single agent environments do provide some performance guarantees during learning, but such assurances in multiagent environments are
not only lacking but also significantly difficult to provide. In a (MAS), a learning agent also
forms a part of the environment for every other learning agent. As such, the environments
of the learners are usually non-stationary which is the key challenge for Multiagent learning
(MAS). It is apparently also a challenge for a learner to learn the moving target of a most
beneficial behavior through exploration in such environments, and at the same time ensure
“good” performance during the exploration. So much so that the latter property has not been
investigated in depth so far. In MAS, either such guarantees are realizable only in the limit,
thereby seriously limiting its practical interest, or are realizable in polynomial time (e.g.
R-MAX [6]) but only for limited classes of games (e.g., constant-sum games). Our goal
is to address this aspect of MAL, i.e., to provide certain meaningful guarantees about the
performance of a learner in a MAS, while it is learning in general-sum games. We develop a
novel algorithm for MAL that maintains the existing policy convergence properties of MAL,
viz. rationality and convergence [5], and in addition (i) applies to arbitrary sized general-sum
games with non-negative payoffs, (ii) ensures a sublinear growth of regret with time such
that it is asymptotically no-regret. This property guarantees that a learner cannot perform
much worse than the empirical best response at any time while it is learning.
Our first algorithm, ReDVaLeR [2], achieves either bounded regret or convergence but
knows the opponent types, and serves as the launchpad for the next algorithm, RVσ (t) . The
latter satisfies policy convergence in some classes of arbitrary sized games, and is no-regret
at the same time, without knowing the opponent types. Each RVσ (t) agent needs to know
only its portion of any equilibrium, besides the other assumptions made in ReDVaLeR , but
applies to a subset of games that is larger than in previous results but smaller than with
ReDVaLeR . We show that the expression for regret of RVσ (t) can have a slightly better form
than those of GIGA [36] and GIGA-WoLF [3], although our analysis is in continuous time.
In experiments using discrete decaying step-sizes instead of continuous time, the payoffs
achieved by RVσ (t) are found to be comparable to those of GIGA and GIGA-WoLF. However,
additional experiments show that our method can converge to equilibrium in some cases
where GIGA, GIGA-WoLF would fail (Sect. 6.3.4). In a class of coordination games, GIGA,
GIGA-WoLF are found to converge to mixed equilibria that make miscoordination highly
likely besides yielding poor expected payoff to both agents, while RVσ (t) is found to always
achieve strict coordination with Pareto-dominating payoffs (Sect. 6.3.3). Our approach is
also the first (as far as we know) successful attempt at convergence of a no-regret technique
in the Shapley game (Table 3).
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we introduce the key concepts and definitions
and discuss related work in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4 we present our argument in favor of policy
convergence as a more desirable criterion than high average payoffs, in an important class
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of games that captures the essence of a MAS. Section 5 presents, analyzes and experiments
with the ReDVaLeR algorithm. Section 6 does the same for the RVσ (t) algorithm, and we
conclude in Sect. 7.

2 Multiagent reinforcement learning
A Multiagent Reinforcement Learning task is usually modeled [19] as a Stochastic Game (SG,
also called Markov Game), which is a Markov Decision Process with multiple controllers.
We focus on stochastic games with a single state, also called repeated games. This refers to
a scenario where a matrix game (defined below) is played repeatedly by multiple agents. We
shall represent the action space of the ith agent as Ai .
Definition 1 A matrix game with n players is given by an n-tuple of matrices,
R1 , R2 , . . . , Rn  where Ri is a matrix of dimension |A1 |×|A2 | . . .×|An |, such that the payoff
of the ith agent for the joint action (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ) is given by the entry Ri (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ), ∀i.
As is usual, we assume that payoffs are bounded, Ri (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ) ∈ [r i , r̄i ], for real r i , r̄i .
A constant-sum game (also called competitive games) is a special matrix game where


Ri (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ) = c, ∀(a1 , a2 , . . . , an ) ∈
Ak ,
i

k

c being a constant. If c = 0, then it is also called a zero-sum game, but this is most meaningful
in 2 player scenarios. An example of such a game with 2 players appears in Table 1. This
game is called Rock-Scissor-Paper (RSP). Here A1 = A2 = {R, S, P} and the game payoffs
for any joint action sum to 0 as shown in Table 1.
A mixed policy, vector π i ∈ (Ai ) for agent i, is a probability distribution over Ai . If the
entire probability mass is concentrated on a single action (some actions), it is also called a
pure policy (partially mixed policy). The joint policies of the opponents of the ith agent will
be given by the vector π −i . We shall usually refer to the ith agent as the learner and the rest
of the agents as the opponents. The expected payoff of the learner at any stage in which the
policy tuple π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π n  is followed is given by

Vi (π i , π −i ) =
π1 (a1 ) . . . πn (an )Ri (a1 , . . . , an ).
(a1 ,...,an )∈



k

Ak

i
Definition 2 For an n-player matrix game, an -best response (B R,
π −i ) of the ith agent to
its opponents’ joint policy (π −i ), for some  ≥ 0, is given by
i


B R,
π −i = {π i |Vi (π i , π −i ) ≥ Vi (π i , π −i ) − , ∀π i ∈ (Ai )}

Table 1 RSP game. (a, b) in the (i, j)th cell is the tuple of payoffs for Row agent and Column agent (in that
order) for each combination of their actions (i, j) ∈ {R, S, P} × {R, S, P}
Actions

Rock (R)

Scissor (S)

Paper (P)

Rock (R)
Scissor (S)
Paper (P)

(0,0)
(−1,1)
(1,−1)

(1,−1)
(0,0)
(−1,1)

(−1,1)
(1,−1)
(0,0)
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i
When  = 0, it is just called a best response (B R0,
π −i ).

Definition 3 A mixed-policy Nash
for a matrix game R1 , R2 , . . . , Rn 
 Equilibrium (NE)

is a tuple of probability vectors π ∗1 , π ∗2 , . . . , π ∗n (policy profile) such that each is a best
i
response to the rest, i.e., π i∗ ∈ B Rπ
∗ ∀i. In terms of payoffs, these conditions can be
−i
restated as
Vi (π i∗ , π ∗−i ) ≥ Vi (π i , π ∗−i ) ∀π i ∈ (Ai ) , ∀i
No player in this game has any incentive for unilateral deviation from the Nash equilibrium
policy, given the others’ policy. There always exists at least one such equilibrium profile for
an arbitrary finite
 matrix
 game [22].
 As an example, the only NE of the 2 player RSP game
in Table 1 is 13 , 13 , 13 , 13 , 13 , 13 .
Definition 4 For a given time range t = 0 . . . T , the regret of a learner (agent i), RgiT is
t=T

t
t
t
given by RgiT = maxπ i t=T
t=1 Vi (π i , π −i ) −
t=1 Vi (π i , π −i ).
This compares the total payoff of the actual sequence of policies of the learner
with the best

t
response to the empirical distribution of the opponent. Note that maxπ i t=T
t=1 Vi (π i , π −i )
t
t=T
is well defined only if the opponents pick their joint-policy sequence {π −i }t=1 before t = 1
(offline), i.e., are incapable of changing their policy sequences on the fly in response to the
ith player’s strategies. This usually means that the opponents are “unadaptive”, but by no
means that the opponents are naive. In particular, the opponents could pick their strategies
offline with the knowledge of the learner’s algorithm, just not its online randomization [10].
This is the “other” type of opponents mentioned in the abstract. The no-regret results of this
paper are proved against this type of opponents, and extending them to arbitrary adaptive
opponents is an important future direction.

3 Related work
Multiagent Reinforcement Learning has produced primarily two types of algorithms. One
type learns some fixed point of the game e.g., NE (Minimax-Q [19,21], Nash-Q [16],
FFQ [20]) or correlated equilibrium (CE-Q [14]). These algorithms can guarantee a certain minimal expected payoff asymptotically in self-play, but it may be possible to guarantee
higher payoff in certain situations if the learner is adaptive to the opponents’ play, instead of
learning the game solution alone. This brings us to the other type of learners that learn a best
response to the opponents’ actual play e.g., IGA [30], WoLF-IGA [4,5], AWESOME [8].
Since mutual best response is an equilibrium, two similar best responding players (such
situations are referred to as self-play) should be able to converge to an equilibrium. WoLFIGA achieves this in 2 × 2 games (assuming it knows its portion of any equilibrium) and
AWESOME achieves it for arbitrary sized games. But an AWESOME agent needs to know an
entire equilibirum profile, meaning that it not only knows the others’ equilibrium policy, but
also that all agents agree on which equilibrium they know in games with multiple equilibria.
Simple Q-learning [31] is also capable of learning a best response to an arbitrary
opponent’s policy provided that latter is stationary. Nevertheless, a straightforward application of Q-learning has been shown to perform well in MAL problems [7,27,28,32]. A
fundamentally different approach to Q-learning for MAS was studied in [33] where values
of mixed policies were learned with function approximation. This algorithm (Hyper-Q) is
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capable of converging to best-response in stochastic games against history independent (Markovian) players. In the repeated RSP game, this algorithm was found to perform well against
IGA but there are no theoretical guarantees of its payoffs while learning. There has also been
some work on playing team games (where the game matrices of all agents are identical) [7,34]
with stronger convergence guarantees owing to the correlation of the game matrices.
Performance guarantees during the learning process are provided by regret matching learRg T

ners. These are algorithms that achieve lim T →∞ T i ≤ 0 (called no-regret algorithms1 ) but
their convergence properties in policies are unknown [1,11,12,18] or at best limited [17]. A
generalized version of IGA, called GIGA, was shown to be no-regret [36] but its convergence
property is unknown. The WoLF version of GIGA [3] was shown to be also no-regret but
convergent to NE only in 2 × 2 games against GIGA. Our contribution, ReDVaLeR [2], is
shown to achieve either no-regret or convergence for different settings of a learning rate parameter σ . Each ReDVaLeR agent is also assumed to know its portion of some equilibrium, i.e.,
there is agreement on equilibrium selection. Noting the limitations of ReDVaLeR , we use it
as a building block to develop a new algorithm, RVσ (t) , that relaxes these strong assumptions
but expectedly, at the cost of wider applicability. RVσ (t) uses a single time dependent σ that
achieves both convergence and no-regret properties simultaneously. More importantly, we
relax the assumption that agents agree on which equilibrium they know their portions of. On
the flipside, convergence in self-play now holds in certain classes of arbitrary sized games.
Another recent work proposed a similar set of properties for a MAL algorithm, with a greater
focus on payoff [26]. This algorithm achieves near best response against stationary players
(in contrast we guarantee near best response against the larger set of eventually stationary
opponents), at least non-Pareto dominated (by another equilibrium) equilibrium payoff in
self-play (in contrast we provide convergence to some equilibrium policy), and at least the
minimax payoff against all other players (in contrast, we guarantee the stronger property of
no-regret payoff that could be greater than the minimax payoff depending on the opponents)
in polynomial time. However, this algorithm needs to know the game matrix of all agents
which is technically stronger than our assumptions.

4 Convergence versus average payoffs
Recently, it has been argued that ensuring high average payoffs is a more desirable criterion
than policy convergence in self-play [26]. Admittedly, policy convergence is a stronger property than what is often required in most games. Ensuring high average payoffs, especially
the self-play criterion 2 in [26], has its merits besides simplicity given that ensuring policy
convergence is a daunting task in general-sum games. However, we can think of at least one
important situation where just ensuring high average payoffs can be far from satisfactory.
Consider the following class of games, which we call simplified coordination games, defined
as:
Definition 5 A two person simplified coordination game is given by two n×n payoff matrices
R1 , R2  such that
1. R1 (a1 , a2 ) = R2 (a1 , a2 ) = 0, ∀a1 = a2 ,
1 Although it is a limit property, the guarantee is a certain minimal bound on the average of payoffs achieved

during learning.
2 This criterion states that the average payoff of the learner must be close to that of the minimal equilibrium

payoff that is not Pareto-dominated by another equilibrium, in polynomial time.
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Table 2 Simplified coordination
games

Actions
(a) Low variance
R1
R2
R3
(b) High variance
R1
R2
R3

C1

C2

C3

(1,3)
(0,0)
(0,0)

(0,0)
(2,2)
(0,0)

(0,0)
(0,0)
(3,1)

(2,100)
(0,0)
(0,0)

(0,0)
(51,51)
(0,0)

(0,0)
(0,0)
(100,2)

2. R1 (a1 , a2 ), R2 (a1 , a2 ) > 0, ∀a1 = a2 , and
3. R1 (a1 , a2 ) + R2 (a1 , a2 ) = C, ∀a1 = a2 , for some constant C.
It is “simplified” because only coordinated action profiles have non-zero payoffs. This game
has n pure equilibria (plus some mixed equilibria) given by the matrix diagonals, but players
may prefer different ones. Such a game captures one of the central questions in MAS, viz.
that of coordination of agents when individual agents may have different preferences. Hence,
this class of games represents some of the most critical applications of MAS.
Table 2 a and b show two games of this class where none of the 3 equilibria is Paretodominated by another. A closer inspection of the self-play criterion of [26] shows us that
an agent only needs to coordinate perfectly with its opponent, 50% of the times (game in
Table 2a) and less than 4% of the times (game in Table 2b) to satisfy this criterion. Therefore,
high “average” payoffs actually does not tell us anything about the more critical goal in this
scenario. The stronger property of policy convergence to a coordinated profile, on the other
hand, ensures that the agents will coordinate their actions perfectly 100% of the times. In
this paper we will show policy convergence properties of our proposed algorithm in some
games, which includes this class.

5 Variable learning rate in arbitrary sized games
We make the following assumptions for the current work,
1.

2.

3.
4.

That the game payoffs are positive, i.e., r i ≥ 0 (we call these non-negative games). This
is merely a technical requirement since any game can be converted to a non-negative
game by affine transformation without changing its strategic properties.
That the ith agent can observe its own instantaneous payoff vector, Vi (over the action
space, and ∀i), i.e., the current expected payoff of each of its actions. This assumption
makes the formal convergence easier to prove and has been used to that effect in earlier
work on IGA, GIGA, WoLF-IGA, GIGA-WoLF. Note the agent gets this information
only after he has made his decision for that round; so it cannot be used for perfect
decision making. Moreover, previous work ([5]) has shown that it is possible to achieve
the effects of this assumption empirically by tracking average payoffs over time.
That the learner can use vanishing step sizes for policy improvement (similar to IGA
and WoLF-IGA).
That the agents are given at the start, their portions of the same equilibrium policy
profile. Although we do not verify it in this article, we believe that an average policy
computed over a period may serve as a good substitute (as in WoLF-IGA), thus relaxing
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this assumption. In this article, we will relax this assumption in an orthogonal direction
(see Sect. 6.3) to allow the agents to see their portions of different equilibria in games
with multiple equilibria (like WoLF-IGA).
Note that the agents do not need to observe the opponents’ policies/actions or payoffs.
However, if these information are available/observable, then the agent can easily estimate
its own payoff matrix and estimate the quantities involved in the above assumptions. Since
these estimates can be unbiased We write the probability of the jth action of the ith agent at
time t as πit ( j) and the expected payoff of this action against the opponent’s current policy
as Vi ( j, π t−i ) and note that

πit ( j)Vi ( j, π t−i ) = Vi (π it , π t−i ).
(1)
j

5.1 The ReDVaLeR algorithm
We use the Replicator [13] rule for policy update of our target algorithm with a WoLF-like
modification, which we call Replicator Dynamics with a Variable Learning Rate (ReDVaLeR).
The discrete form of the algorithm (slightly different from previously reported [2]) is
πit+1 ( j) =

πit ( j) + ηπit ( j)lit ( j)Vi ( j, π t−i )

1 + η j lit ( j)πit ( j)Vi ( j, π t−i )

(2)

for η being a small step size, learning rates lit ( j) are defined later (Definition 4), and initial
condition: πi0 ( j) = |A1i | . Note that the probability values generated above are automatically
bounded in the range [0, 1] if r i ≥ 0. Also the distribution is indeed a probability distribution
(i.e., sum 1) without the need of a projection operation unlike GIGA or GIGA-WoLF.
In continuous time, i.e., as η → 0, the above equation yields the following differential
equation for the dynamics of the n-player system

d t
lit (k)πit (k)Vi (k, π t−i )]
(3)
(πi ( j)) = πit ( j) × [lit ( j)Vi ( j, π t−i ) −
dt
k

j = 1 . . . |Ai |, i = 1 . . . n. The analysis in continuous time serves the purpose of checking
asymptotic behavior of an otherwise discrete system where the learning rates are decayed
appropriately. Thus even though the corresponding behaviors hold in discrete time, 3 , we will
only study the continuous time behavior, especially with regards to convergence.
Equation 3 is similar to the Replicator rule except for the learning rates, l. The Replicator
Dynamics (RD) [13] have been extensively studied in population genetics and evolutionary
game theory. It is known that the NE may not be asymptotically stable for RD in many games,
e.g., RSP game in Table 1. A recent result in [15] provides some insight into this general
problem. They show that if the dynamics are uncoupled (as in RD, IGA), i.e., if the agents
do not use the opponents’ payoff information in its dynamics, then it is unable to overcome
an “information barrier” and consequently unable to guarantee convergence. WoLF-IGA
incorporates the opponent’s payoff information in the form of the Nash equilibrium and
consequently succeeds in this respect, albeit in small two-player games only. As in WoLFIGA, the learning rates l may be one way to provide the necessary coupling, and we define
lit ( j) for ReDVaLeR as
3 The key equations in Lemma 1 which are used repeatedly in all results, also hold with ≤ replacing =, for

small non-vanishing η; hence for the discrete version.
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lit ( j)

=

⎧
⎨1
⎩

1+σ
1−σ

if πit ( j) < πi∗ ( j)
when πit ( j) ≥ πi∗ ( j)

if π t−i is stationary (independent of t)
otherwise

(4)

where π i∗ is an NE policy. We typically require a constant 0 < σ
1. We note that when
πit ( j) ≥ πi∗ ( j), πit ( j)Vi ( j, π t−i ) ≥ πi∗ ( j)Vi ( j, π t−i ) since Vi ( j, π t−i ) ≥ 0 ∀ j, which is
similar to the situation described as winning in [5], excepting that now it is defined for each
action. Thus this scheme of variation in the learning rate is in the spirit of Win or Learn Fast
(WoLF).
Note from Eq. 4 that ReDVaLeR knows if the opponents are stationary or not. Later we
shall see that to select the value of the parameter σ , ReDVaLeR essentially needs to be
able to distinguish between self-play and otherwise non-stationary opponents as well. These
assumptions make the proofs of the various properties of ReDVaLeR in the next section quite
intuitive. Even so, we rigorously prove these results to serve as the baseline for proving the
non-trivial results of RVσ (t) later. In particular, through the following analysis, we identify
σ as the only parameter that needs to be handled differently to ensure that RVσ (t) provides
these guarantees without knowing the opponent types.
5.2 Analysis of ReDVaLeR
j

For the sake of brevity, we write Vi ( j, π t−i ) simply as Vi . Let Di (π̃ i , π it ) be the Kullback
Leibler divergence between the ith agent’s policy at time t and an arbitrary distribution π̃ i ,
given by



π̃i ( j)
t
(5)
Di (π̃ i , π i ) =
π̃i ( j) log
πit ( j)
j

When the policy trajectory follows the unmodified RD instead of ReDVaLeR , we write the
same as DiR D . The following result is crucial to all subsequent analyses.
Lemma 1 For any fixed policy π̃ i the following hold,

d
j
(lit ( j)πit ( j) − lit ( j)π̃i ( j))Vi
(Di (π̃ i , π it )) =
dt
j


d
j
(πit ( j) − π̃i ( j))Vi
(DiR D (π̃ i , π it )) =
dt
j

Proof Differentiating both sides of Eq. 5 and using Eq. 3 (without lit ( j) for unmodified RD)
we get the results.


5.2.1 No-regret property
Here we show that ReDVaLeR produces performance bounded learning in the sense of
no-regret.
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Theorem 2 The following holds,


T
0


Vi (π it , π t−i )dt ≥

1−σ
1+σ




max
πi

T
0

Vi (π i , π t−i )dt −

log |Ai |
(1 + σ )

That is, as σ → 0+ , the maximum regret of the ith agent playing against n − 1 “other”
opponents (see Definition 4) is RgiT ≤ log |Ai |.
Proof Note that the integrals exist since Vi is continuous and bounded, and π it is continuous
over time since the opponents’ policies are Lebesgue measurable (being vectors of real
numbers). We write Di (π̃ i , π i0 ) i.e., the initial divergence as D0 . Integrating the expression
in Lemma 1 in the given time range and noting that Di (π̃ i , π iT ) ≥ 0 we have

−D0 ≤
0

T

⎛
⎞


j
j
⎝
lit ( j)πit ( j)Vi −
lit ( j)π̃i ( j)Vi ⎠ dt
j



≤ (1 + σ )

j
T

0


≤ (1 + σ )

T

0

Vi (π it , π t−i )dt − (1 − σ )



T

0

Vi (π it , π t−i )dt − max(1 − σ )
πi

Vi (π̃ i , π t−i )dt, using (1)

0

T

Vi (π i , π t−i )dt

since π̃ i was arbitrarily chosen. Rearranging and noting that D0 ≤ log |Ai | if the initial
policy is uniform, we get the result.

This result is obtained along the same line as the no-regret property of the multiplicative
weight algorithm in [11]. It tells us that the player can ensure a constant bound expected
regret at any time provided it uses σ → 0+ and that the average regret of the learner is
RgiT /T ≤ log |Ai |/(1 + σ )T , thus ensuring no-regret asymptotically. Using the technique
of Freund and Schapire [11] we can extend this result to arbitrary adaptive (non-oblivious)
opponents in a discrete version of ReDVaLeR, thus ensuring universal consistency.4

5.2.2 Stationary opponents
Since no-regret players are known to converge to best response policies against stationary
opponents, it follows that ReDVaLeR will converge in such cases as well. Alternatively, since
ReDVaLeR identifies stationary opponents (Eq. 4) and plays unmodified RD — essentially
a gradient mechanism — it is guaranteed to learn a best rseponse. Below we provide an
independent proof of this result using Lyapunov’s direct method that is novel to this area.
Later in Sect. 6.1, we shall allow the opponents to be eventually stationary and provide a more
general proof of convergence of RVσ (t) , that does not need the algorithm to be no-regret, or
the learning rate to be fixed.
Theorem 3 If the opponents are playing stationary policies, then the policy sequence of
ReDVaLeR converges to the best response to the opponents’ policy.
4 When regret is defined over actual game history instead of the opponent’s policy, no-regret amounts to the

stronger property of universal consistency which applies to adaptive opponents as well.
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Proof Let π̄ i be the best response of the ith agent to the opponents’ fixed joint policy, given
by π −i . Then substituting π̄ i in place of the arbitrary policy in Lemma 1, we have


d
j
j
lit ( j)πit ( j)Vi − lit ( j)π̄ i ( j)Vi
(Di (π̄ i , π it )) =
dt
j
j


j
j
t
π̄ i ( j)Vi , by (4)
=
πi ( j)Vi −
j

=
≤

j
t
Vi (π i , π −i ) − Vi (π̄ i , π −i ) , by (1)
0 , since Vi (π it , π −i ) ≤ Vi (π̄ i , π −i )

That Vi (π it , π −i ) ≤ Vi (π̄ i , π −i ) is evident since otherwise π it would have been the best
response to π −i . Now since the divergence measure (Di ) is not strictly decreasing, it is
possible that Di (π̄ i , π it ) converges to a non-zero positive value and thus the sequence {π it }
converges to a policy other than π̄ i , say π i . But even in that case Vi (π i , π −i ) must be equal
to Vi (π̄ i , π −i ), which implies that π i must also be a best response. Thus Di is Lyapunov
with the best response as the point of stability.


5.2.3 Self-play
Finally the following theorem establishes that ReDVaLeR converges to Nash equilibrium in
self-play, provided all agents know their portions of the same equilibrium.
Theorem 4 When all the n agents are following ReDVaLeR algorithm, the sequence of their
policies converge to their NE in non-negative games of any size, provided they choose their
portions of the same equilibrium, and they all choose σ = 1 (this requirement will be relaxed
subsequently).
Proof The goal is to prove that players using the ReDVaLeR algorithm on a repeated matrix
game can converge to a NE of the one-shot game. That they need to choose their portions of
the same equilibrium (for rule 4) is not really an extra burden, as discussed in [8], for agents
sharing a single algorithm. We define the sum of the divergence measures of the n agents
(from Eq. 5) from their respective equilibria π i∗ , for ReDVaLeR and RD respectively as
S=

n

i=1

Di (π i∗ , π it ) and S R D =

n


DiR D (π i∗ , π it )

i=1

Note that since Di , DiR D ≥ 0 and differentiable, S, S R D are also ≥ 0 and differentiable. The
general strategy of the proof is to show that d/dt (S) < 0 under appropriate assumptions at
any time t. We accomplish this by comparing d/dt (S) with d/dt (S R D ) at that time had RD
been using the same instantaneous policies. Since S ≥ 0 and S = 0 holds only when all
agents have reached their respective equilibria, d/dt (S) < 0 implies that S is a Lyapunov
function 5 for the dynamic system, i.e., the system converges to the equilibrium. Now at any
time t we consider two distinct cases
5 This is true only for internal starting policies since all pure policies are fixed points of (3). So S cannot be
global Lyapunov.

123

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst (2007) 15:281–312

291

d
Case 1: dt
(S R D ) ≤ 0. Then we have,

dS
d
d
≤ (S) − (S R D )
dt
dt
dt
 d
 d
(Di (π i∗ , π it )) −
(D R D (π i∗ , π it ))
=
dt
dt i
i
i

j
=
(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j))(lit ( j) − 1)Vi
i

=



j



(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j))(−σ )Vi

j

j,πit ( j)≥πi∗ ( j)

i

+





i

j,πit ( j)<πi∗ ( j)

(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j))(σ )Vi =
j



(< 0) < 0.

i


It can easily be seen why the j terms above must be strictly negative. If π it = π i∗
then ∃ j s.t. 0 < πit ( j) < πi∗ ( j). The contribution of this term could be zero only if
j
Vi = 0, otherwise this term contributes a strictly negative term to the sum. But note
that the opponents are all using ReDVaLeR which allows only mixed policies while
learning, and partially mixed or pure policies only in the limit. Given this constraint,
j
Vi can be zero only if all the payoffs for action j in Ri are zeroes. This means the jth
action of the learner must be dominated by all other actions and strictly dominated
by at least one other action (unless of course all the payoffs are zero, which is a
degenerate case that we ignore). This means the equilibrium probability for the jth
action must be zero, i.e., πi∗ ( j) = 0. But this contradicts the fact
that πit ( j) < πi∗ ( j)
t
for some πi ( j) > 0. Hence the contribution of term j in the j must be strictly
negative, and consequently the entire sum must be strictly negative. Note that in this
case, we do not need to assume σ = 1, but any 0 < σ
1 will do, thus ensuring
asymptotic no-regret payoffs by Theorem 2.
This case actually encompasses all non-negative games where NE is stable under
RD but not asymptotically stable, including all non-negative 2×2 games with a unique
mixed equilibrium. For all other types of non-negative 2 × 2 games, we also have
convergence as simplifying the ReDVaLeR update rule (Eq. 3) for two action games
shows that it is identical to a gradient ascent rule (albeit an extra multiplicative term
involving the product of both action probabilities, which changes only the magnitude,
not the direction of the gradient in such games), which we know converges in policies
in these games [30]. That result also extends to ReDVaLeR.
Case 2: ddt (S R D ) > 0. Then we have,
 d
 d
dS R D
dS
−
=
(DiR D (π i∗ , π it )) −
(Di (π i∗ , π it ))
dt
dt
dt
dt
i
i

j
t
∗
t
(πi ( j) − πi ( j))(1 − li ( j))Vi
=
ij

=σ



π t ( j) − π ∗ ( j) V j , by (4)
i

i

i

ij

>

d RD
(S ), if σ = 1, ∀i
dt
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This implies again that dtd (S) < 0. The strict inequality in the last step is explained
as in case 1. Thus we see that S is Lyapunov for the system of ReDVaLeR adaptation,
though in case 2, it needs σ = 1 which is counterproductive to Theorem 2.

When σ = 1, the player essentially stops learning (learning rate is 0) when it is winning
but continues when losing (learning rate is 2). This principle has been explored before under
the title of Win Stay, Lose Shift [23,25]. We note that this assignment of learning rates
ensures that KL divergence is Lyapunov, i.e., divergence decreases monotonically. However,
monotonic convergence is not essential for convergence, and the original schedule of learning
rates (0 < σ
1) may also produce convergence, though KL divergence may sometimes
increase in that case.
5.3 Experiments with ReDVaLeR
We have experimented with the ReDVaLeR algorithm in the non-negative version of the
repeated RSP game (Table 1) and the games shown in Tables 3 and 4. Unlike the RSP
or Shapley games, the game in Table 4 has a unique partially mixed equilibrium at π ∗1 =
[0, 0.8333, 0.1667] and π ∗2 = [0.6923, 0.3077, 0]. Since ideally RD and ReDVaLeR do
not play such policies in finite times, it is interesting to note the convergence behavior
of ReDVaLeR in such games. The values of S and S R D (starting at a randomly selected
completely mixed initial point for games with uniform equilibrium policies) at various times
are plotted for these games in Figs. 1, 2 and 3. We have noted in these games that ReDVaLeR
can converge to NE in self-play even when 0 < σ
1, and even in a game where S R D
is always increasing (in RSP game, Fig. 1). However, in the Shapley game where no-regret
algorithms usually cycle exponentially [17], ReDVaLeR has been found to converge for some
large enough values of σ (depending on the randomly chosen mixed starting profile since
the uniform profile is also the equilibrium profile) in self-play (Fig. 2). Moreover, we used
identical σ values for both agents in these experiments but clearly different values would
have worked as well.
6 A time decaying σ : the RVσ (t) algorithm
We have noted the drawbacks of a fixed small value of σ , chiefly the problem with simultaneous satisfactions of Theorems 2 and 4. This means that ReDVaLeR must be able to
distinguish between self-play opponents and otherwise non-stationary opponents in order to
Table 3 The shapley game

Table 4 Arbitrary 3 actions
game with partially mixed
equilibrium

123

Actions

C1

C2

C3

R1
R2
R3

(1,0)
(0,0)
(0,1)

(0,1)
(1,0)
(0,0)

(0,0)
(0,1)
(1,0)

Actions

C1

C2

C3

R1
R2
R3

(1,7)
(1,1)
(5,10)

(3,1)
(10,0)
(1,15)

(1,1)
(1,1)
(2,1)
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Fig. 1 The sum of KL
divergences (S) in the
non-negative version of RSP
game
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Fig. 2 The sum of KL
divergences (S) in the Shapley
game
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select the appropriate σ . Also the agents need to know their portions of the same equilibrium
in self-play.
To alleviate these problems we now explore the effects of a variable σ on the behavior
of ReDVaLeR. We will show that all of the theorems can be preserved in their spirits with
some additional constraints and the agent can be oblivious of the nature of its opponents
(stationary/non-stationary/self-play), by using a single schedule of a time decaying σ , as
defined below:
Definition 6 (σ -Schedule) A time decaying schedule for σ (t) is defined by the 3 conditions:
1.
2.
3.

σ (t) is continuous and 1 ≥ σ (t) ≥ 0, ∀t,
σ (t) ≥ σ (t  ), ∀t  ≥ t,
σ (t) → 0 as t → ∞.

123

294

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst (2007) 15:281–312

Fig. 3 The sum of KL
divergences (S) in the game of
Table 4

7

RD
ReDVaLeR (σ = 0.0005)

Sum of KL Divergences

6
5
4
3
2
1
0

0

1e+06

2e+06
Time

3e+06

4e+06

We call the modified version of ReDVaLeR using this σ -schedule, RVσ (t) . The learning rates
lit ( j) for RVσ (t) are defined as

lit ( j) =

1 + σ (t) if πit ( j) < πi∗ ( j)
1 − σ (t) if πit ( j) ≥ πi∗ ( j)

(6)

In contrast with Eq. 4, now the learner does not need to identify whether the opponents are
stationary or self-play or otherwise non-stationary. Moreover, as we will see subsequently,
there exist suitable σ (t) such that both no-regret (in all games) and convergence (in many
games) in self-play will hold.
In the following analysis, we shall use the symbol x to mean the L∞ norm of a vector,
i.e., x = maxi |xi | and the symbol 1 to mean a vector of all 1’s.
6.1 Convergence against eventually stationary opponents
Here we establish that RVσ (t) with σ -schedule of Definition 6 converges to the set of -best
responses against stationary opponents (Theorem 6) from which follow the convergence
against eventually stationary opponents (Corollary 7). The proof of Theorem 6 does not require σ (t) to be continuous (condition 1 in Definition 6). However, this condition is necessary
for RVσ (t) to be no-regret (see Theorem 9). Thus this proof is more general than no-regret
algorithms satisfying the Theorem 6, and is of independent interest.
Lemma 5 (Payoff-continuity) If π i1 and π i2 are two policy vectors of agent i against the
stationary joint policy of the opponents π −i and if π i1 − π i2  ≤ α for some α > 0, then
|Vi (π i1 , π −i ) − Vi (π i2 , π −i )| ≤ α|Ai |r̄i
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Proof Let us write the gradient vector of the agent’s payoff function as
g(π −i ) = ∇ π i Vi (π i , π −i ). Note that all elements of g(π −i ) are positive. Now,
|Vi (π i1 , π −i ) − Vi (π i2 , π −i )| = |(π i1 − π i2 ) · g(π −i )|
≤ |π i1 − π i2 | · g(π −i )
≤ α1 · g(π −i )
≤ α|Ai |r̄i
In other words, if two policies are close then so are their payoffs against a given joint policy
of the opponents.

The following Theorem establishes that RVσ (t) with a non-stationary σ (Definition 6)
converges to the set of -best responses against stationary opponents.
Theorem 6 For a given  > 0, there exists a time τ , such that after τ a RVσ (t) agent i using
σ -schedule in Definition 6 against n − 1 stationary agents, is guaranteed to converge to the
i
set of -best response policies, B R,
π −i .
Proof Suppose the opponents’ joint stationary policy is given by π −i , and let us consider
i
i
some π̄ i ∈ B R0,
π −i . Clearly the payoff of all policies in B R0,π −i have the same value and
let this value be V̄i . At any given time t we consider the following two cases:
i
Case 1: π it ∈B R,
π −i
This means

V (π it , π −i ) < V̄i − 

(7)

Now substituting π̄ i in place of the arbitrary policy in Lemma 1, we get


d
j
j
lit ( j)πit ( j)Vi −
lit ( j)π̄ i ( j)Vi
(Di (π̄ i , π it )) =
dt
j

j

≤ (1 + σ (t))Vi (π it , π −i ) − (1 − σ (t))Vi (π̄ i , π −i )
= Vi (π it , π −i ) − Vi (π̄ i , π −i ) + σ (t)[Vi (π it , π −i ) + Vi (π̄ i , π −i )]
< − + σ (t)[Vi (π it , π −i ) + Vi (π̄ i , π −i )] , by (7)
≤ − + 2σ (t)V̄i
The second step (above) follows from the fact that lit ( j) is upper and lower bounded
j
(1 + σ (t)) and (1 − σ (t)) respectively, and Vi are positive. Now according to
Definition 6 there exists a time (τ ) such that for all t  > τ , σ (t  ) < 2V̄ . Thus at all




i

i
such times d/dt (Di (π̄ i , π it )) < 0 whenever π it ∈B R,
π −i . This means, the policy
approaches a best response at such times. By Lemma 5, the policy cannot approach
a best response without its payoff approaching V̄i . Thus at some point t  , the value

i
of the policy will exceed V̄i −  and so, π it ∈ B R,
π −i . This brings us to the 2nd
case.
i
Case 2 :π it ∈ B R,
π −i . Also t ≥ τ

t
i


If π i ∈ B R,
π −i , ∀t > t then we are done. Otherwise, there exists a time t > t
t  −η

such that π i



i
t
i
∈ B R,
π −i and π i ∈B R,π −i , where η is the time step size used in
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t  −η

Eq. 2. So Vi (π i



, π −i ) ≥ Vi (π it , π −i ). Also
t  −η

π i



− π it  ≤ η(1 + σ (t  − η))r̄i
≤ 2ηr̄i

Then by Lemma 5,
t  −η

Vi (π i



, π −i ) − Vi (π it , π −i ) ≤ 2η|Ai |r̄i2

that is


Vi (π it , π −i ) ≥ V̄i − ( + 2η|Ai |r̄i2 )


So even though π it is not an -best response, it is an ( + 2η|Ai |r̄i2 )-best response.
Also from time t  case 1 applies and both of the policy and the payoff approach that of
a strict best response. Thus after τ , the payoff never falls below V̄i −( +2η|Ai |r̄i2 ) =
i
V̄i − , since η → 0. Lastly, π it may not converge to any specific policy in B R,
π −i ,
only stay in this set asymptotically.

Remarks on Theorem 6: It would have been possible to prove a stronger result than Theorem 6,
viz. convergence to a strict best response using the following strategy: for t > τ define a
continuum (t) such that
(t)
, ∀t > τ .
2 V̄i
t
i
π i ∈B R(t),π −i , ∀t >

• σ (t) <

τ.
•
• and (t) → 0 as t → ∞.
However, this also imposes a certain bound on the rate of decay of σ (t) which may be too
fast for later results, especially Theorem 13. Consequently, we settle for a weaker result to
preserve a relative latitude in the choice of σ (t).
An immediate corollary of Theorem 6 is that RVσ (t) will converge to an -best response
even if the opponents do not always play stationary policies, as long as they settle down to
a stationary profile at some finite time, τ1 . This is justified by replacing τ in the proof of
Theorem 6 by max{τ, τ1 }. We state this result as the following corollary.
Corollary 7 If there exists a time τ1 such that all other agents play stationary policies at
all times t > τ1 , then for a given  > 0, there exists a time τ , such that after max{τ1 , τ } an
RVσ (t) agent i using σ -schedule in Definition 6, is guaranteed to converge to the set of -best
i
response policies, B R,
π −i .
Note that this does not require all of the opponents to start playing a stationary profile
simultaneously, only that the last opponent to settle down should do so at some finite time
point τ1 . This notion of eventually stationary opponent profile is a stronger condition than the
non-stationary opponent policies with a limit considered in [35]. In the latter the opponents
may never actually settle down but continue with an ever decreasing distance from a limiting
profile. Our setting is stricter in the sense that we need this fixed profile to be attained in finite
time.
6.2 No-regret property
Here we prove the no-regret property of RVσ (t) . Compared to ReDVaLeR , now the regret is
no longer constant bounded but can grow with time. However, with the help of the following
lemma we can show that the average regret goes to 0.
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Lemma 8 (Vanishing average) Given Definition 6 for σ (t), we have lim T →∞

T
0

σ (t)dt
T

= 0.

T
Proof It is easy to see that A = 0 σ (t)dt ≥ 0 for any T . If A is bounded above by a finite
number then we are done. However, if A → ∞ as T → ∞, then applying L’Hospital’s rule
to the ratio, we get


T
d  T σ (t)dt
σ (t)dt
dT 0
lim 0
= lim
T →∞
T →∞
T
1
= lim σ (T )
T →∞

=0



by property 3 of Definition 6.
Theorem 9 If a RVσ (t) agent i uses the decaying σ -schedule of Definition 6, then
lim

T →∞

RgiT
≤0
T

i.e., the algorithm is asymptotically no-regret.
Proof As in Theorem 2 in [2], we have
⎛
⎞
 T 

j
j
⎝
lit ( j)πit ( j)Vi −
lit ( j)π̃i ( j)Vi ⎠ dt
−D0 ≤
0


≤

j
T

0


=

0

T

j



(1 + σ (t))Vi (π it , π t−i )dt −

Vi (π it , π t−i )dt −

T
0

0

T

(1 − σ (t))Vi (π̃ i , π t−i )dt


Vi (π̃ i , π t−i )dt+

T
0



σ (t) Vi (π it , π t−i ) + Vi (π̃ i , π t−i ) dt

Rearranging and again noting that D0 ≤ log |Ai | and that π̃ i was chosen arbitrarily, we have
 T
 T
Vi (π it , π t−i )dt ≥ max
Vi (π̃ i , π t−i )dt
π̃ i 0
0
 T


−
σ (t) Vi (π it , π t−i ) + Vi (π̃ i , π t−i ) dt − log |Ai |
0

≥ max
π̃ i


0

T


Vi (π̃ i , π t−i )dt − 2r̄i

T

σ (t)dt − log |Ai |

0

Thus the regret of the ith agent is bounded by
 T
σ (t)dt + log |Ai |
RgiT ≤ 2r̄i
0

The result now follows from Lemma 8.



We postpone the choice of actual form of σ (t) till the end of Sect. 6.3.2 in order to satisfy
both convergence and no-regret, whereby we also compare the emerging expression of regret
with those from GIGA, GIGA-WoLF.

123

298

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst (2007) 15:281–312

6.3 Convergence in self-play
Since we do not assume any coordination in the choice of the equilibrium, for games with
multiple equilibria, the agents may be given their portions of different equilibria. Though
this is not difficult to handle in 2 × 2 games [5], in larger games this becomes a daunting
task. In this paper we show evidence, however, that even in the face of miscoordination in
equilibrium selection, agents may still be able to converge to some equilibrium using the
RVσ (t) algorithm. We show that the variable learning rate is useful in games with a unique
mixed equilibrium, which even though coordination in equilibrium selection is by default,
has proven to be a hard case for convergence in self-play. We also show that in a special
class of games called simplified coordination games allowing conflicting interest, RVσ (t) is
likely to converge to coordinated action profiles while GIGA and GIGA-WoLF may converge
to undesirable mixed equilibria. We also show empirical evidence in two other games with
many equilibria, that even if RVσ (t) agents are given their portions of different equilibria they
do converge to some equilbrium.
6.3.1 2 × 2 games
In all 2 × 2 games, the RVσ (t) algorithm can be shown to be equivalent to WoLF-IGA.
In cases where IGA converges (in policy) in self-play, only the direction of the gradient
matters and this remains same for RVσ (t) . In the special case where WoLF-IGA (but not
IGA) converges in policy, the learning rate change in RVσ (t) turns out to be the same as
WoLF-IGA thus guaranteeing convergence like WoLF-IGA. Hence RVσ (t) always converges
to an equilibrium policy in all 2 × 2 games, when given its portion of any equilibrium, similar
to WoLF-IGA.
6.3.2 Games with unique mixed equilibrium
Here we prove that a σ -schedule can be designed satisfying Definition 6 such that convergence
to equilibrium can be achieved in these games. We make another technical assumption, that
the minimum game payoff of i is strictly positive, r i > 0, for all i. Again this is easy to
satisfy in self-play without changing the game strategically. The following lemmas will be
used in the proof of the final Theorem for convergence of RVσ (t) in self-play.
As a first step we show that the requirement on the value of σ (i.e., σ = 1; Theorem 4)
from the perspective of any learner i can be relaxed in two ways. The first is a direct but minor
relaxation given by the lemma below. Here we use the concept of policies that are not i -close
to the equilibrium policy, meaning that the difference in the corresponding probabilities for
any action is greater than i .
Lemma 10 If the policy of i is not i -close to its equilibrium, i.e., min j |πit ( j)−πi∗ ( j)| > i ,
for some i > 0, then dtd Di (π i∗ , π it ) < −α for some 0 < α < i r i , if i uses
σ >

1
1+

i r i −α
r̄i +α

Proof The proof closely follows Theorem 4. In case 1 of that proof, σ only needs to be
positive. It is really case 2 that needs to be relaxed. It is easily seen that the proof of case 2 in

123

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst (2007) 15:281–312

299

that theorem can be stated for individual agents as well. Consequently when dDiR D /dt > 0,
we have


dDiR D
dDi
π t ( j) − π ∗ ( j) V j
−
=σ
(8)
i
i
i
dt
dt
j

Now since min j |πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j)| > i , there is at least one action, say k, such that πit (k) <
πi∗ (k). Therefore, |πit (k) − πi∗ (k)|Vik ≥ i r i . So,

dDiR D
j
(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j))Vi + (πit (k) − πi∗ (k))Vik
=
dt
j =k

j
=
(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j))Vi − |πit (k) − πi∗ (k)|Vik
j =k


j
≤
(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j))Vi − i r i
j =k

Hence,


(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j))Vi ≥
j

j =k

Equation 8 gives us
we have

dDiR D
+ i r i
dt

(9)


d DiR D
j
d Di
t
∗
dt − dt ≥ σ j =k (πi ( j) − πi ( j))Vi . Substituting from Eq. 9,
dDiR D
dDi
−
≥σ
dt
dt



dDiR D
+ i r i
dt



d DiR D

dt ≤ r̄i .
−3
−3
To illustrate the nature of this relaxation, if i = 2 × 10 , r̄i = 2, r i = 1, and α = 10 ,
then we have σ > 0.9995. The main Theorem on convergence of RVσ (t) in self-play, however,
depends on this to be maintained for only a finite time (O( α1 )).
The following lemma allows σ to approach 0 in self-play, but applies only when the others
are sufficiently close to their portions of the equilibrium. First we define “sufficiently close”.
j
Let us write the vector of ith agents payoff, Vi over index j ( j ∈ Ai ), as Vi . Also from
Game Theory [24] we know that for a non-negative game with a unique completely mixed
equilibrium there is a constant Vi∗ > 0 for each i such that,
The result follows noting that

Vi ( j, π ∗−i ) = Vi∗ , ∀ j
j

Clearly when the opponents’ policies are close to their respective equilibria, Vi = Vi ( j, π t−i )
is also close to Vi ( j, π ∗−i ) = Vi∗ , since payoffs are bounded.
Definition 7 The opponents of agent i are said to be sufficiently close to their equilibria if
Vi − Vi∗ 1 < Vi∗
and this distance does not exceed Vi∗ at any future time.
In the above definition, . is the L∞ norm mentioned in Sect. 6. Now the following Lemma
relaxes the the value of σ from 1 when the opponents are sufficiently close to their equilibria.
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Lemma 11 In self-play in non-negative games with a unique completely mixed equilirium,
when the opponents of agent i are sufficiently close to their equilibria, the value of σ used
by i need only satisfy
σ (t) >

Vi − Vi∗ 1
Vi∗

to ensure convergence of π it to π i∗ .
Proof Let us call c = Vi − Vi∗ 1. Note that under the given conditions, Vi∗ − c ≤ Vi ≤
Vi∗ + c, ∀ j. Then the rate of variation in Di (π i∗ , π it ) can be given as before by,
j


dDi
j
=
(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j))lit ( j)Vi
dt
j



=

(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j))(1 − σ (t))Vi +

j:πit ( j)≥πi∗ ( j)



≤



j

= (1 − σ (t))(Vi∗ + c)





(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j))(1 + σ (t))(Vi∗ − c)

j:πit ( j)<πi∗ ( j)

(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j)) + (1 + σ (t))(Vi∗ − c)

j:πit ( j)≥πi∗ ( j)

= (1 − σ (t))(Vi∗ + c)




(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j))

j:πit ( j)<πi∗ ( j)

(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j)) − (1 + σ (t))(Vi∗ − c)

j:πit ( j)≥πi∗ ( j)

⎡
⎢
=⎣



j

j:πit ( j)<πi∗ ( j)

(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j))(1 − σ (t))(Vi∗ +c) +

j:πit ( j)≥πi∗ ( j)

(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j))(1 + σ (t))Vi



(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j))

j:πit ( j)≥πi∗ ( j)

⎤


⎥
(πit ( j) − πi∗ ( j))⎦ (1 − σ (t))(Vi∗ + c) − (1 + σ (t))(Vi∗ − c)

j:πit ( j)≥πi∗ ( j)


t
The equality of the penultimate step follows from the fact that
j:πit ( j)≥πi∗ ( j) (πi ( j) −

t
πi∗ ( j)) + j:π t ( j)<π ∗ ( j) (πi ( j) − πi∗ ( j)) = 0. Since the factor in the first square braces
i
i
in the last step is strictly positive, the only situation when this is strictly negative is when
c
σ (t) > V ∗ . This makes Di Lyapunov implying convergence to π i∗ .

i

Interestingly, if all agents are sufficiently close to their equilibria and all use the σ as in
Lemma 11, then all of them will converge to their respective portions of the equilibrium. This
means for each i, Vi − Vi∗ 1 will decrease and that agent will be able to further decrease
its σ with time while satisfying Lemma 11. The key is to get them sufficiently close to their
equilibria. We show how in the next Theorem but before that we establish one last necessary
Lemma.
Lemma 12 (KLD-L∞ correspondence) For any two probability distributions, x, y, we have
x − y ≤  for some 1 >  > 0 if
D(x, y) ≤

2 2
log 2

Proof From Lemma 12.6.1 of [9], we have
2


1
D(x, y) ≥
|xi − yi |
2 log 2
i
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The result follows noting that


i
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|xi − yi | ≥ 2x − y.



The following Theorem establishes the convergence of RVσ (t) to Nash equilibrium in
self-play under appropriate assumptions.
Theorem 13 There exists a σ -schedule satisfying Definition 6, which when followed by n
RVσ (t) agents guarantees the convergence of their policies to the unique completely mixed
equilibrium profile of the strictly positive game, provided each agent knows
1.
2.
3.
4.

the maximum game payoff of any agent, Rmax = maxi r̄i ,
the maximum size of action space among all agents, maxi |Ai |,
the minimum equilibrium payoff among all agents, mini Vi∗
the total number of agents, n.

Proof The proof is stated in two steps. In step 1, we establish how agents can get sufficiently
close to their equilibria. In step 2, we show how they can continue to approach their equilibria
in self-play satisfying condition 3 of Definition 6.
Step 1: For each i, we need the opponents (−i) to be sufficiently close to their equilibria.
Now


 p r p −α p
t
∗
any agent p can make π p −π p  ≤ δ p for some δ p by using σ p > 1/ 1 + r̄ p +α p

(Lemma 10) for sufficiently long (say τ ) to bring D p (π ∗p , π tp ) down from initial value

2δ 2
D p (π ∗p , π 0p ) = log |A p | + j π p∗ ( j) log π p∗ ( j) to D p (π ∗p , π τp ) ≤ logp2 (Lemma 12)
at the rate of α p (Lemma 10). Therefore,
τ≥

D p (π ∗p , π 0p ) − D p (π ∗p , π τp )
αp

and this can be easily computed. Note that agent p can also compute appropriate  p
and α p since it has the knowledge of the necessary policies, π tp and π ∗p .

Now if π tp − π ∗p  ≤ δ p ∀ p ∈ {−i}, then π t−i − π ∗−i  ≤ p δ p approximately (ignoring the terms in second and higher powers of δ). As a consequence, i’s
opponents will be sufficiently close to their equilibria if
Vi − Vi∗ 1 ≤ max |Vi − Vi∗ |
j

j

≤ |Ai |r̄i π t−i − π ∗−i 

δp
≤ |Ai |r̄i
p

is less than

Vi∗ .

This can be ensured for all agents p, by forcing
δp ≤

mini Vi∗
n Rmax maxi |Ai |

(10)

Hence the conditions in the Theorem statement. Thus all agents can be brought
sufficiently close to their equilibria by some σ -schedule following Definition 6.
Step 2: After τ , each agent i must always satisfy Lemma 11. Since the starting value (σ (τ ))
has been specified in Step 1, i only needs to know an appropriate dσ/dt to keep
changing its σ satisfying Lemma 11. It is easy to see that a suitable dσ/dt is







! t
"
dσ
−1
d

(11)
0>
>
π−i (a−i ) 
max 
Ri ( j, a−i )
j 
dt
Vi∗
dt

a−i
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where a−i is a joint action played by i’s opponents. Note that the terms within the
|.| in Eq. 11 represents the rate of change of the expected payoff of the jth action.
Hence the appropriate rate dσ/dt can be computed from i’s observation of its payoff
vector Vi at all times. Also since Eq. 11 requires dσ/dt be always negative after τ ,
Definition 6 is satisfied. This completes the proof.

It may seem that step 1 in Theorem 13 could be eliminated by having the agents start at their
given equilibria. But since we do not assume coordination in equilibrium selection, this may
actually make convergence impossible in other games with multiple equilibria, as shown in
next section. Since the agents do not know the payoffs of others, they do not know if the
game has a unique or multiple equilibria.
Remarks on the assumptions in Theorem 13 The assumption of uniqueness of the equilibrium is fairly standard in asymptotic stability results, though it is often unnecessary if the
initial policies fall in the “basin of attraction”of the desired equilibrium and this basin is
well-defined, i.e., there is no other equilibrium in close proximity. Since many games of
practical interest (e.g., RSP, multi-player matching pennies, soccer, grid navigations etc.)
involve identical payoff bounds on agents, a suitable heuristic for Rmax would be to use r̄i .
For Assumption 3, again a suitable heuristic is r i similar to Assumption 1. Assumption 4,
or at least a loose bound on it, is reasonable in a MAS. For assumption 2, we can use the
heuristic of the agents’ own action space size, |Ai |. Moreover, from Eq. 10 it is clear that the
agent does not need to know the accurate values under the Assumptions 1–4. Instead, knowing appropriate loose bounds on the respective quantities is sufficient. So we see that these
assumptions do not necessarily impose much practical burden of extra knowledge. In fact,
most of the conditions used in the Lemmas leading to and including Theorem 13 are more
restrictive than actually necessary. This is corroborated by the experiments later in the section.
Choice of σ In Theorem 13, the agent was made to deduce the value of dσ/dt at every round.
However, if we can analytically deduce an appropriate expression for σ (t) that satisfies the
theorem and Definition 6, then this computation can be simplified. The task is to discover a
suitable value (say ν > 0) such that




 

! t
"
1
d

(12)
π (a−i )  ≥ ν
Ri ( j, a−i )
max 
j 
Vi∗
dt −i

a−i
so that dσ/dt can be assigned −ν. Note that a tight bound ν can be zero at the equilibrium
but not otherwise. Now Eq. 12 is true if




  


!
"
1
d
t


(13)
π
R
(
j,
a
)
(a
)
i
−i
−i −i  ≥ ν

r̄i |Ai |
dt
a

j

which is true if


−i




  


!
"
1
d
t


π
R
(
j,
a
)
(a
)
i
−i
−i −i  ≥ ν

r̄i |Ai | 
dt

j a−i

(14)

Equation 13 is produced by replacing the max by the average in Eq. 12. Unless the max is
0, the average is also necessarily non-zero, but not so for the min. Hence we could not have
replaced with min in Eq. 12. Now in self-play,
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⎡
⎤


!
"
d
t
⎣Vks lkt (s) −
π t (a−i ) = π−i
(a−i )
πkt (s)Vks lkt (s)⎦
dt −i
k∈{−i}
s∈Ak
$
#


t
s
∗ t
∗ t
t
s t
πk (s)Vk lk (s)
(Vk − Vk )lk (s) + Vk lk (s) −
= π−i (a−i )
s

k∈{−i}

where as before, Vks

is the payoff of the sth action
of thekth agent. Now in self-play situation,


the σ of kth agent needs to be just above

Vk −VK∗ 1
VK∗

. From this observation, assuming a

small non-zero value of r i , we can deduce an appropriate value of ν as 6


r i mink Vk∗
ν=
σ2
|Ai |r̄i

(15)

Furthermore, note that while in self-play Eq. 11 will lead dσ/dt to approach 0 from below
as t → ∞, if the opponents are not self-play dσ/dt may not approach 0. But
dσ/dt

 since

is negative, the no-regret property (Theorem 9) will be preserved if we make  dσ
dt explicitly
decay with time. A sample schedule that does this and satisfies Eq. 15 is (for t ≥ 1)


r mink Vk∗
dσ
(16)
σ2
=− i
√
dt
|Ai |r̄i t


2r i mink Vk∗
. Thus a RVσ (t) agent can use the above
This gives us σ (t) = 1+β1 √t where β =
|Ai |r̄i
σ -schedule for convergence to equilibrium in self-play while being oblivious of the nature
of the others. In case the others are not self-play agents, the same schedule will guarantee
the results of Theorem 6, Corollary 7 and Theorem 9.
Note that the learner can calculate β given the assumptions in Theorem 13. Also given
our choice of σ = 1+β1 √t the regret bound of RVσ (t) becomes
√ 
 
√
4r̄i
log(1 + β T )
T
T−
Rgi ≤
+ c,
β
β
expectedly satisfying Theorem 9, whereas GIGA-WoLF has
√
RgiT ≤ (2 + r̄i2 |Ai |) T − c
and half that for GIGA, for comparable constants c, c . The presence of the log term in our
expression for RgiT might make it grow slower. It must also be noted that GIGA and GIGAWoLF use a discrete analysis in contrast with our continuous time analysis.
Experiments Theorem 13 basically says that if σ decays slow enough, then monotonic convergence of the sum of KL divergences can be √
achieved in self-play. For the following experiments we use a σ -schedule σ (t) = 1/(1 + β t) throughout, and show the results for various
values of β in Figs. 4 and 5 corresponding to the Shapley game (Table 3) and the game in
Table 4, respectively. We used η = 2 × 10−4 and the starting policies were selected close to
the edges of the probability simplex since these are the policies that make convergence most
difficult in RD. Note that the game in Table 3 is not strictly positive, and that in Table 4 is
not strictly positive for the column agent. Also note that σ does not really need to be close
to 1 as long as step 1 of Theorem 13 requires. In both experiments, in just 2000 iterations σ
decreases to less than 75% for the middle values of β as shown in Figs. 4 and 5.
6 This is one of many choices for ν that simplifies the derivation of the expression for σ .
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Fig. 4 The sum of KL
divergences in the Shapley game
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with σ =

1.8
β = 0.1
β = 0.5
β = 0.6

1.6

1+β t

Sum of KL Divergences

1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

Fig. 5 The sum of KL
divergences in the game of
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Since GIGA and GIGA-WoLF use a discrete analysis in contrast with our continuous
time analysis, in the following experiment we actually compare the performances of these
algorithms by forcing RVσ (t) to adopt a non-vanishing learning rate η similar to GIGA and
GIGA-WoLF. The performances of RVσ (t) in the RSP and Shapley games are shown in
Figs. 6 and 7, respectively. To compare with GIGA and GIGA-WoLF, the payoffs of these
agents are also plotted. For all three agents a common opponent was chosen. This opponent
played a fixed sequence of policies against which all three learning agents were made to
adapt. However, this opponent did not learn. Instead, it chose its starting
√ policy randomly
and then incremented it in random steps, with a step size of η = 1/ t. The RVσ (t) agent
was also slightly
modified to be comparable to the other learners. Its step size was also set
√
to η = 1/ t (same as the other 2 learners and the opponent). However, the payoff curves
of RVσ (t) are still smooth in Figs. 6 and 7 because its projection function (Eq. 2) is smooth
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1.005
1.004
Average expected payoffs

Fig. 6 The average expected
payoff plots for GIGA,
GIGA-WoLF, and RVσ (t) (using
√
η = 1/ t, β = 0.1) against a
random player in the
non-negative version of the RSP
game, i.e., all payoffs increased
by 1
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Fig. 7 The average expected
payoff plots for GIGA,
GIGA-WoLF, and RVσ (t) (using
√
η = 1/ t, β = 0.1) against a
random player in Shapley game
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(unlike GIGA, GIGA-WoLF). The results show that the average expected payoff of RVσ (t) is
comparable (note the narrow range of y-axes) to GIGA or GIGA-WoLF (all approaching the
equilibrium payoffs in each game) even if it uses a discrete schedule of η instead of η → 0.
6.3.3 Behavior in simplified coordination games
The key question in this class of games (introduced in Sect. 4) is that of coordination when
individual agents may have different preferences. The difference of preferences is enforced
by condition 3 (Definition 5) which makes the agents prefer different actions in non-identical
interest games; however, empirical convergence seems to hold even when this condition
is violated. The following two lemmas and the experimental results suggest that RVσ (t) in
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self-play converges to playing the same action even if they were given different pure equilibrium policies (e.g., the ones they prefer) at start. GIGA and GIGA-WoLF on the other
hand can sometimes converge to mixed policies with poor expected payoffs, and where
miscoordination is highly likely.
The following lemma says that 2 RVσ (t) agents cannot converge asymptotically to playing
uncoordinated actions in these coordination games. Instead, if we considered finite time
convergence then this would be true of any pair of no-regret algorithms, since if not true
then an agent would have regret. So the following lemma is true for RVσ (t) agents but not
necessarily for arbitrary no-regret algorithms.
Lemma 14 Two RVσ (t) agents cannot converge asymptotically to uncoordinated policies in
the simplified coordination game.
Proof We look at the probabilities of the joint actions ( j, k), i.e., p jk = π1t ( j)π2t (k). We
show that p jk cannot approach 1 if j = k. Now the derivative of p jk is
ṗ jk = π̇1t ( j)π2t (k) + π1t ( j)π̇2t (k)
≤ π1t ( j)π2t (k)[π1t (k)R2 (k, k) + π2t ( j)R1 ( j, j)

{R1 (s, s) + R2 (s, s)}π1t (s)π2t (s)] + 2Cσ (t)
−
s

≤ π1t ( j)π2t (k)[π1t (k){R2 (k, k)(1 − π2t (k))
−R1 (k, k)π2t (k)} + π2t ( j){R1 ( j, j)(1 − π1t ( j))

−R2 ( j, j)π1t ( j)} − C
π1t (s)π2t (s)] + 2Cσ (t)
s = j,k

The reordering in! the last step assumes
" j = k and would not hold
! otherwise. Clearly
" it
is negative when π2t (k)/(1 − π2t (k)) ≥ (R2 (k, k)/R1 (k, k)) and π1t ( j)/(1 − π1t ( j)) ≥
(R1 ( j, j)/R2 ( j, j)). So if π2t (k) and π1t ( j) both approach 1 for j = k, then for large enough
t ṗ jk < 0, meaning at least one of them must decrease.

Lemma 15 If at a large enough time in the simplified coordination game, both RVσ (t) agents
assign their highest probabilities to the same action ( j), then the probability of both players
playing j increases, i.e., ṗ j j > 0.
Proof
ṗ j j ≥ π1t ( j)π2t ( j)[π1t ( j)R2 ( j, j) + π2t ( j)R1 ( j, j)

−
{R1 (s, s) + R2 (s, s)}π1t (s)π2t (s)] − 2Cσ (t)
s

≥ π1t ( j)π2t ( j)[min{π1t ( j), π2t ( j)}(R2 ( j, j) + R1 ( j, j))

−
{R1 (s, s) + R2 (s, s)}π1t (s)π2t (s)] − 2Cσ (t)
s

=

π1t ( j)π2t ( j)C[min{π1t ( j), π2t ( j)} −


s

−2Cσ (t)
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Fig. 8 The probabilities of R3 and C3 of two RVσ (t) agents starting at [0.005, 0.005, 0.99],
[0.99, 0.005, 0.005], in the coordination games. Left: game in Table 2(a), Right: game in Table 2(b). Each
agent used β = 0.2 and η = 2 × 10−3

The lemma follows from the fact that,
π1t (k) = arg maxk π2t (k).


s

π1t (s)π2t (s) ≤ min{π1t ( j), π2t ( j)} if j = arg maxk


The above lemmas do not rigorously prove convergence to some equilibrium, but provide
strong evidence to that effect. The case that the RVσ (t) policies never converge does not appear
in such games with pure equilibria, since otherwise the average regret (measured with mixed
policies that were played, instead of actions) would not vanish asymptotically. The following
experiments provide additional evidence of this. Our experiments in this class of games used
the two games shown in Table 2 and various completely mixed starting policy profiles. The
game in 2(b) has a high variance in payoff distribution to verify whether convergence holds
even to action profiles (e.g., R1 , C1 , or R3 , C3 ) that one of the players dislikes strongly.
Each RVσ (t) player was given its portion of the equilibrium policy that it would prefer, e.g.,
player 1 was given [0, 0, 1] and player 2 [1, 0, 0]. Two RVσ (t) agents always converged to a
coordinated action profile, sometimes even to action profiles R1 , C1  and R3 , C3  depending
on the starting point, in both games. Figure 8 shows both RVσ (t) agents converging to their
3rd actions (i.e., R3 , C3 ) in both games even when each starts close to its desired policy and
uses its desired equilibrium. GIGA and GIGA-WoLF often converged to coordinated action
profiles but sometimes also to mixed equilibria e.g., [1/51, 0, 50/51], [50/51, 0, 1/51] in
2(b). This happens when they start close to their preferred policies like the RVσ (t) agents.
Figure
the sum of the coordinated joint actions of two GIGA-WoLF agents, i.e.,
 t 9 shows
t
s π1 (s)π2 (s), which converges to the inner product of the mixed equilibrium profile that
they converge to. It also shows the low probability of coordination of the resulting profile.
This not only means that the agents would play uncoordinated actions most of the times,
but also that even the expected payoffs of both agents (≈ 1.96 for both) are lower than
at any coordinated action profile. Note that GIGA-WoLF converges to this same undesired
√
equilibrium whether it uses η1 = 1 or η1 = 2 × 10−3 (like RVσ (t) ), where ηt = η1 / t.
We believe the reason behind this advantage of RVσ (t) is that in games with multiple
equilibria (where at least one is pure) it is hard for RVσ (t) to converge to a mixed equilibrium
instead of a pure one. GIGA (-WoLF) can converge to such mixed equilibrium whenever
the gradient vector is collinear with the current policy vector, which has been empirically
observed to happen surprisingly often in these games. In contrast, RVσ (t) uses the pairwise
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Fig. 9 The sum of the joint probabilities of diagonal actions when two GIGA-WoLF agents start at
[0.005, 0.005, 0.99], [0.99, 0.005, 0.005], in the coordination games. Left: game in Table 2(a), Right: game
in Table 2(b). Each agent used η1 = 2 × 10−3
Table 5 General games with multiple equilibria
Actions
(a) Game with 18 equilibria
R1
R2
R3
R4
(b) Wilson’s game with inaccessible equilibria
R1
R2
R3

C1

C2

C3

C4

(5,2)
(2,2)
(3,2)
(2,1)

(3,1)
(2,2)
(4,1)
(5,5)

(2,4)
(2,2)
(2,1)
(2,3)

(1,5)
(1,1)
(1,4)
(1,1)

(0,0)
(2,3)
(3,0)

(3,2)
(2,2)
(0,0)

(0,3)
(0,0)
(1,1)

product of the gradient with policy vector, which can be collinear with the policy vector only
when the gradient vector is uniform. This becomes highly improbable due to the changing
learning rates.
6.3.4 Experiments in other games
We performed further experiments with the games in Table 5, where the one in 5(a) has 18
equilibria. The two RVσ (t) agents were given their parts of two different equilibria: agent 1
was given [0, 2/3, 1/3, 0] and agent 2 [0, 0, 1, 0] and
√ [0, 2/3, 1/3, 0], [0, 0, 1, 0] is not an
equilibrium profile. RVσ (t) , using σ (t) = 1/(1+β t) and β = 0.4, in self-play converged to
the equilibrium profile [0, 2/3, 1/3, 0], [0, 0, 0, 1], starting at the uniform policy as shown
in Fig. 10 (left). Figure 10 (right) shows the same for a different starting point, and reaching
the Pareto-optimal equilibrium [0, 0, 0, 1], [0, 1, 0, 0]. With other given mismatched profiles, other starting policies, and some other values of β, either this or an equilibrium profile
consisting of one of the agent’s given portion of equilibrium was the point of convergence. Moreover, when σ (t) was set to be always zero (i.e., ordinary RD) the algorithm sometimes got
stuck at non-equilibrium points indicating that the change in learning rate is indeed playing
a role in convergence of RVσ (t) . Both GIGA and GIGA-WoLF also often converged to
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Fig. 10 The probabilities of R1 , R2 , R3 , C1 , C2 , C3 , for two RVσ (t) agents with β = 0.4 and η = 2 × 10−3
each, in the game of Table 5(a). Left: Starting profile uniform. Right: Starting profile randomly selected as
[0.156405, 0.288977, 0.269116, 0.285502], [0.165791, 0.668417, 0.078020, 0.087772] leading to Paretooptimal equilibrium

non-equilibrium policies unlike RVσ (t) . Figure 11 shows that GIGA-WoLF in self-play
converges to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium starting at the uniform profile, if they use
η1 = 2 × 10−3 , though it takes them significantly longer than RVσ (t) . But if η1 = 1 then they
converge to a non-equilibrium solution [0.296789, 0, 0.299060, 0.404151], [0, 0, 0, 1] after a few initial iterations and remain there forever. Clearly this is to be expected, because the
gradient of the row agent at this profile is a uniform vector which is normal to its simplex,
thus bringing the projection back to the same policy. So no matter how small ηt gets, the
row agent will not be able to overcome this non-equilibrium policy. This brings to light an
interesting aspect of the asymptotic behavior of GIGA-WoLF. GIGA-WoLF seeks to provide
convergence guarantee in continuous time but no-regret guarantee in discrete time, arguing
that the discrete dynamics should approach the continuous dynamics (thus satisfying both
convergence and no-regret asymptotically) with an appropriate schedule of decaying ηt . Our
results, however, show that this may not happen. The discrete dynamics may converge (to
non-equilibrium solution) prematurely preempting any convergence guarantee in continuous
time. Besides, there is the possibility of chaotic behavior in this transition that has also not
been studied. Note in contrast, that our analyses are all in continuous time, which is simulated
by a small η in the experiments.
Game 5(b) has two partially mixed equilibria (which are inaccessible in Shapley’s sense
[29]) and one pure equilibrium. All of RVσ (t) , GIGA and GIGA-WoLF were found to
converge to the pure equilibrium, since this point is easily reachable and isolated.

7 Conclusion
We have presented ReDVaLeR that guarantees (a) convergence to best response against stationary opponents and either (b) constant bounded regret against arbitrary opponents, or
(c) convergence to Nash equilibrium policies in self-play. It is shown to achieve both (b)
and (c) empirically but we need to assume that all agents must know their portions of
the same equilibrium, and be able to distinguish among different types of opponents. We
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Fig. 11 The probabilities of R1 ,
R2 , R3 , C1 , C2 , C3 for Row and
Col agents both using
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game of Table 5(a). Starting
profile uniform, with
η1 = 2 × 10−3
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also presented a modification, RVσ (t) , that theoretically achieves (a ) convergence to nearbest response against eventually stationary opponents, (b ) no-regret payoff against arbitrary
opponents and (c ) convergence to some Nash equilibrium policy in some classes of games,
in self-play. Each agent now needs to know only its portion of any equilibrium. Furthermore, RVσ (t) agents do not need to know their opponents’ types. The regret potentially grows
slower than those of GIGA and GIGA-WoLF although experiments with discrete decaying
steps (like GIGA, GIGA-WoLF) show their performances to be similar. Moreover, experiments show that our method can converge to equilibrium in some games where GIGA and
GIGA-WoLF would fail, and converge to more desirable equilibria in coordination games.
Future directions include more detailed characterization of the class of opponents to ensure
stronger performance/convergence properties. We also intend to study a more practical version of RVσ (t) by using estimation of payoff vector Vi (as in Q-learning), and the equilibrium
policy (as in WoLF-IGA), effectively eliminating these assumptions.
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